In May 2008, the FDA ordered the manufacturer of rosiglitazone, GlaxoSmithKline, to conduct a trial in response to evidence from metaanalyses that rosiglitazone was associated with a higher risk of myocardial infarction and death from car diovascular causes than placebo or medications that were not based on nonthiazolidinedione comparators. 5, 6 Other studies suggested that pio glitazone, an alternative thiazolidinedione, was not associated with such risks. 7, 8 Before enroll ment began, some argued that the evidence of the inferior safety of rosiglitazone was strong enough to make the trial ethically unjustifiable. Two FDA epidemiologists wrote in a 2008 memorandum that a headtohead trial "would be unethical and exploitative" and that even a robust informed consent process could not overcome the prob lem. 9 This was not the consensus FDA view, which was that the uncertainty regarding the cardiovascular risks associated with rosiglitazone, as well as those associated with pioglitazone, was sufficient to justify a trial. 10 These concerns triggered a February 2010 letter from members of Congress to the FDA de manding a justification for the trial and alleg ing that the consent form did not provide ade quate risk information. 11 In response, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg expanded the FDA investigation of the safety of rosiglitazone, obtained advice from an FDA advisory commit tee, and asked the IOM to convene our commit tee. 6 Although the FDA advisory committee rec ommended that the TIDE trial be continued if rosiglitazone was permitted to remain on the market, in September 2010, the FDA halted the trial and placed stringent new restrictions on the availability of rosiglitazone. 12, 13 The TIDE experience made the FDA appreci ate the need for greater attention to the ethics of postmarketing research. First, it posed ques tions about what standard of evidence about drug risk justifies a decision by the FDA to require postmarketing research, particularly randomized trials, as well as what evidence could render such trials unacceptable. Second, it raised ques tions about what ethical obligations the FDA has to patients who participate in these studies. Finally, it highlighted a potential FDA role in ensuring that institutional review boards (IRBs) are completely informed in their efforts to pro tect study participants. Although major deficien cies with the TIDE consent form were identified by some FDA scientists and, later, by the IOM committee (Table 1) , 4,9 the TIDE investigators countered that it had been approved by "480 ethics committees and IRBs." 14 However, the language of the consent form, the trial design, and the materials supporting the justification of the trial raised a question for the IOM commit tee about whether these bodies adequately under stood the nature of the evidence that gave rise to the trial. The IOM committee proposed a framework for evaluating the ethics of FDA required postmarketing research 15 and made a number of ethics findings and recommendations. 4 
ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FDA
The IOM committee began by noting that the public health mission of the FDA gives rise to potentially competing ethical obligations "to pro tect the public's health by having strong science on which to base regulatory decisions" and "to protect participants in research that it requires." 4 Requiring a postmarketing study is an ethical decision, reflecting a weighing of these values.
The committee described the conditions that must be present to justify a decision to require a postmarketing study. The FDA should require postmarketing research only when, first, the un certainty about the benefit-risk balance of a drug is so great that a responsible decision about its regulatory status cannot be made on the basis of existing evidence; second, the re search will reduce this uncertainty; third, the FDA will use the research results expeditiously to make a regulatory decision; and fourth, suffi cient protections for research participants can be ensured.
The committee argued that when the FDA re quires a postmarketing study, it assumes a mea sure of ethical responsibility for the welfare of the study participants; exercise of that responsi bility cannot be handed off to contractors or the industry sponsor. The responsibility is particu larly strong when the patients' treatment is de termined by the study, such as in a randomized trial, linking any adverse outcomes directly to a regulatory decision to require a study of that type. This determination led to one of the most important recommendations from the IOM com mittee: the responsibilities of the FDA to research participants mean that it should mandate a ran domized design only if the FDA "has concluded that an observational study could not provide the necessary information [to help answer the important public health question at issue], that an RCT [randomized, controlled trial] is likely to generate the information within the necessary timeframe, and that the necessary RCT is ethi cally acceptable." This recommendation com ports with but adds some further conditions to the current legal authority of the FDA under the FDA Amendments Act of 2007, which empowers the agency to require a randomized trial if it cannot obtain the data it needs from an obser vational study. 1 In light of the critiques of the TIDE trial as inherently unethical, the committee addressed the justifiability of trials in which participants may encounter a net increase in risk, as com pared with ordinary clinical care, but no realis tic prospect of personal benefit. It argued that such trials can be justified only if they are nec essary to answer a critically important public health question, if the potential risk is accept Table 1 . Major Deficiencies in the Informed-Consent Form for the TIDE Trial.*
Consent Element Specific Deficiencies
Inadequate explanation of the purpose of research
Did not clearly explain that the purpose of the study was to definitively establish that rosiglitazone involved a significantly higher risk of serious harms than pioglitazone Title included minor intervention (vitamin D) whose effects were not a subject of FDA concern Inadequate explanation of the risks of research participation
Did not convey that the FDA was concerned primarily about the safety of rosiglitazone and was requiring the sponsor to conduct the TIDE trial to investigate safety signals Submerged cardiovascular risks associated with rosiglitazone in a list of outcomes related to potential effects of vitamin D on cancer and bone fractures Characterized previous studies as having provided conflicting findings concerning the cardiovascular safety of rosiglitazone, when the weight of the evidence was against rosiglitazone
Inadequate explanation of alternatives to research participation
Did not disclose that the current clinical standard of care had moved away from the use of rosiglitazone Did not mention that the American Diabetes Association had recommended that rosiglitazone not be used able and minimized, and if special safeguards are in place, including a highly explicit informed consent process to ensure that patients under stand that they are potentially shouldering addi tional risk solely to contribute to the public good. Specific actions that the FDA should take to meet its ethical obligations include specifying the study design, title, end points, and primary analy ses; identifying design features that it views as ethically and scientifically indispensable; and, for clinical trials, specifying a safetymonitoring scheme. The committee recommended that the FDA routinely communicate with IRBs about re quired postmarketing studies -for example, by issuing a letter to accompany IRB applications that conveys information that is material to the IRB's determination of the ethics of the research, as well as providing additional communications over the life of the study as warranted by new information about the drug or by changes in pro fessional practice. The committee also believed that the FDA was ethically obligated to actually use the findings from required studies to make timely regulatory decisions.
INFORMED-CONSENT PROCESS FOR REQUIRED POSTMARKETING TRIALS
The IOM committee emphasized that the ade quacy of the informedconsent process is only one element in the ethics of FDArequired post marketing research. Other central, and indeed prior, features include ensuring that the selec tion of participants is equitable and that the level of risk to which they are exposed is acceptable. The committee also recognized, however, that there are challenges to achieving meaningful in formed consent in postmarketing trials of drugs for which there is a signal indicating the possi bility of drugrelated harm. In such cases, there is a suspicion that the benefits of the drug may not justify its risks and often that it may have a worse benefit-risk profile than alternative drugs available to treat the same condition. The com mittee concluded that for postmarketing trials of such drugs, there are "heightened obligations to ensure that potential research participants un derstand the risks posed by study enrollment." 4 This was of particular importance for rosiglita zone, because the cardiovascular problem it ap peared to cause was the same outcome that good diabetic control was supposed to improve -in other words, if this elevation in risk were real, there could be little offsetting benefit.
The committee recommended several mea sures to strengthen the consent process in order to maximize patients' understanding of the con text in which the trial is being conducted, includ ing what is already known about the risks asso ciated with the drug. The report discussed both specific disclosures in the informedconsent form and special efforts that could be made to ensure adequate comprehension of complex in formation regarding risks (Table 2) . To assist IRBs, the committee recommended that the FDA issue guidance interpreting current informed consent regulatory requirements in the context of required postmarketing studies.
S treng thening P os tmarke ting Re se ar ch and it s Governance
Because a true picture of the benefit-risk profile of a drug only emerges over time, two different IOM committees have stressed the need for the FDA to fully embrace a "lifecycle approach" to drug regulation, in which its obligations to pro tect public health are taken as seriously once a drug is on the market as they are before approval is granted. 4, 16 Postmarketing regulatory oversight is assuming heightened importance as the FDA accrues additional authority to fasttrack drugs for approval on the basis of more limited evi dence than was previously required in order to address unmet medical needs and accelerate in novation. [17] [18] [19] This changing landscape raises several challenges for ensuring the ethical con duct of research with approved drugs and balanc ing societal interests in drug innovation and drug safety. We highlight two of these challenges here.
First, not all postmarketing research is ethi cally equivalent. The TIDE trial represented an iconic kind of postmarketing study: an FDA required randomized trial to study a drug whose benefit-risk profile was under a cloud of suspi cion and at a time when alternative treatments were available, albeit not all well studied. The risks to patients of participating in the trial probably outweighed the prospect of direct ben efit. By contrast, when the FDA requires an ob servational study that uses previously collected data, the clinical experience of the participants is unaffected, the risks incurred are not at the behest of the FDA, and ethical concerns are largely confined to confidentiality and the right to control one's medical information.
Both of these scenarios can be distinguished from the context in which a phase 4 trial is re quired as a condition of an accelerated drug ap proval and is initiated soon thereafter. Here, the trial requirement is not imposed because of a newly emerging concern about a drug already in clinical use but because additional evidence is needed to confirm the initial judgment that the benefits of a new drug are likely to outweigh its risks. Often, this initial judgment is based on the use of a surrogate end point for drug bene fit, not on the clinical outcomes that matter most. Especially when the new drug targets an unmet medical need, it may be in the patients' best interest to take it, pending further timely research. The ensuing trial is undertaken to confirm the improvement in clinical outcomes predicted by the surrogate -a different epis temic and ethical situation than that in which substantial evidence suggests that the surrogate is misleading or that other harms might offset a known clinical benefit. The volume of phase 4 and other research with FDAapproved drugs is increasing, not only because of the expanded authority of the FDA to require such research but also because of the growing volume of comparativeeffectiveness re search. In some cases, there may be no or little ethical difference between FDArequired post marketing research and comparativeeffective ness research initiated by academic investiga tors. By contrast, a comparativeeffectiveness study of two widely used drugs that is not oc casioned by heightened concern about the risks of one drug relative to the other is markedly dif ferent, ethically, from a study required by the FDA to pursue a safety signal that is already of such concern that practice patterns are shifting, even if both studies use randomized designs.
These differences highlight the need for IRBs to be sensitive to the place where a study falls within the life cycle of a drug and to the reason for the research. Depending on who is initiating the research, for what reasons, and when, the same study design may have very different rami fications for the benefit-risk balance of the study and what patients need to know in order to provide meaningful informed consent. Trials that may be regarded as unethical late in the life cycle because of accumulated evidence can be much easier to initiate earlier if the need for additional research is anticipated and planned at the time of initial approval. In the case of rosiglitazone, this need could have been antici pated from preapproval data showing an adverse Meaningful, balanced summary of existing evidence about the safety of the study drug Explanation of why experts deem it reasonable to ask patients to participate in the study, notwithstanding the risks involved If applicable, a statement that participants are being asked to assume a higher risk than they would be likely to encounter under the current clinical standard of care solely for the purpose of answering an important public health question Drug-risk information should go beyond a bullet-point list of possible side effects, indicating where the weight of evidence falls concerning the likelihood that serious harms will occur and the extent of current scientific uncertainty At a minimum, disclosures should include boxed warnings, a "major statement" in directto-consumer advertisements, salient findings from FDA advisory committees, and a summary of findings from peer-reviewed studies
Explanation of alternatives to research participation Clear explanation of how the care that patients receive in the study may differ from the care they currently receive or would be likely to receive if they did not enroll If applicable, a statement that the current clinical standard of care has moved away from use of the study drug, and an explanation of why effect on serum lipids as well as the use of a surrogate end point (glycemic control) for a firstinclass drug. 5, 20 Second, the experience with rosiglitazone underscored the fragility of our current system of discovering risks associated with drugs. This system relies heavily on drug sponsors and FDA scientists to conduct safety analyses on the ba sis of data from clinical trials, some or all of which are not publicly available, and to release findings to the public. It has been shown repeat edly that the published record can misrepresent evidence known to the FDA. 21, 22 In the case of rosiglitazone, scientists from GlaxoSmithKline and the FDA had information from 42 clinical trials, of which only 7 were published and the others were inaccessible. Triggered by concerns expressed by the World Health Organization in 2006, GlaxoSmithKline conducted and shared with the FDA a metaanalysis of the safety of rosiglitazone that used these data, confirming a possibly elevated risk of ischemic events, but neither these results nor the primary trial results were shared with the public until an unrelated court settlement forced GlaxoSmithKline to re lease its complete clinicaltrial data. 23 This ac cess led to the published metaanalysis by inde pendent researchers that made these data and concerns public in 2007. 5 It is often the work of independent scientists that has highlighted critical safety problems with approved drugs. 5,24-29 Yet currently, data from pre marketing studies that are submitted as part of a new drug application or a supplemental new drug application are largely shielded from release to external scientists and the public owing to concerns about a competitive disadvantage to drug sponsors. 30, 31 The IOM committee stopped short of calling on the FDA to increase public access to such data but recommended that the agency initiate a process to determine ways to "appropriately balance public health, privacy, and proprietary interests to facilitate disclosure" of relevant data. 4 Greater transparency would better equip independent scientists to investigate early safety signals. 31 Consideration should be given to making drugsafety data from clinical trials available to the public on request once the FDA has reached a decision regarding a new drug ap plication or a supplemental new drug application or once the manufacturer has abandoned the application, unless the manufacturer can articu late a persuasive reason why it would result in competitive harm and the FDA determines that this harm outweighs the public health benefits of releasing the information.
Conclusions
The experience with rosiglitazone and the TIDE trial offers a lesson in how our current approach to the oversight of drugsafety and postmarket ing research can fail both the public and the re search participants. Although terminating the TIDE trial was justifiable, it left regulators with highly suggestive but nondefinitive data on the relative safety of rosiglitazone and the closest clinical alternative, pioglitazone. 32 Reactive policymaking is tempting but prob lematic. The history of regulation of human sub jects research suggests that rules that are "born in scandal and reared in protectionism" 33 often fall short of providing meaningful protections to research participants and that, once adopted, regulations can ossify and become difficult to dislodge. Nevertheless, the IOM committee's re port makes a number of actionable recommen dations that the FDA can implement under its existing authority. 34 In addition, appointment of an independent ethics advisory board would strengthen the decision making of the FDA as it confronts emerging ethical challenges -both those arising from required postmarketing tri als and those stemming from powerful new drug surveillance systems, such as the FDA's Sentinel Initiative. As the pace of the translation of discoveries from bench to bedside continues to intensify, so too does the imperative for thoughtful ethical governance throughout the life cycle of a drug.
